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Abstract: As a participator in corporate investment decision-making, the institutional investor is 
directly related to the corporate innovation investment. However, the economic policy uncertainty is 
aggravated by problems, such as economic slump and trade friction. Thus, institutional investors are 
not optimistic about the prospects of innovation investment. To explore the influence of institutional 
investors on corporate innovation investment from the perspective of economic policy uncertainty, 
using the 2010–2018 panel data in China and the fixed effect model, the influences of institutional 
investors on innovation investment and the moderating effects of the economic policy uncertainty 
were analyzed. Results show that institutional investors facilitate corporate innovation investment. 
Moreover, the increasing economic policy uncertainties repress the promoting effect of institutional 
investors on innovation investment. Furthermore, the institutional investors boost the corporate 
innovation investment by improving the internal control and relieving the financing constraints. For 
private companies, new and high-tech companies, the promoting effect of institutional investors 
on the corporate innovation investment is inhibited by the economic policy uncertainty to a small 
extent. For the listed companies located in areas with a high level of investor protection and 
intellectual property protection, the economic policy uncertainty has a minimal influence on the 
institutional investors and corporate innovation investment. The conclusions obtained from this 
study provide empirical evidence for giving full play to the role played by institutional investors 
in corporate innovative development. The conclusions also reveal, from the macroscopic level, 
that the consistency and stability of governmental economic policies have important effects on 
corporate development.
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Introduction
Innovation-driven economic development 
is a global trend. Specifically, in the Sino-
American trade war, the events, such as the 
suppression of Huawei 5G, knock the alarm 
bell of independent research and development 
(R&D) in all countries. Hence, the entire 
society is aware of the strategic significance 
of corporate innovation and key technologies 
to the companies and the entire country. 
Compared with traditional investments, such 
as fixed assets investment, the innovation 
investment is featured by large capital demand, 
long recycling period, high risk, and others. 
The interruption of the capital supply chain 
will generate high adjustment costs and sunk 
costs (Ju et al., 2013; Gu et al., 2019). As 
important enterprise managers, institutional 
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investors have become an important force 
that cannot be ignored in the current capital 
market. The American financial market is the 
most developed market across the globe, and 
the institutional investors account for over 80% 
of the American stock market. Up to the end of 
2018, the total market value held by nine types 
of professional institutional investments, such 
as foundation and insurance, occupied 12.6% of 
the total value of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets in China. Therefore, the corporate core 
competitiveness can be enhanced. Moreover, 
their long-term development can be maintained, 
considerably, by giving full play to the promoting 
effect of institutional investors on the corporate 
innovation investment.
With the continuous improvement of 
China’s capital market, institutional investors 
have an ignorable influence in the corporate 
operation process by exerting the functions 
of improving the corporate information quality 
(Bushee & Goodman, 2007; Kong et al., 
2019) and maintaining the market stability 
(An & Zhang, 2013; Callen & Fang, 2013). 
These functions, if well exerted, can elevate 
the corporative governance level (Yi et al., 
2010; Bushee et al., 2014; Jahnke, 2019) and 
corporate value (Chemmanur et al., 2009). In 
addition, such functions can improve corporate 
performance (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; Li & Han, 
2013; Wondirad, 2020), thus further facilitating 
the companies to proactively fulfill their social 
responsibilities (Amel-Zadeh & George, 2018; 
Nofsingera et al., 2019; Agudelo et al., 2019). 
Investor protection provides a guarantee for the 
institutional investors to improve the corporate 
internal governance (La Porta et al., 2000), allow 
full play to their operating management function, 
and greatly alleviate the financing constraints 
(Whited & Wu, 2006; Fan, 2018). However, 
faced with the pressure of economic downturn, 
the Chinese government has promoted a series 
of economic policies to support the economic 
transformation and upgrading and provides an 
impetus for sustainable economic development. 
Nevertheless, the frequent formulation and 
adjustment of financial and monetary policies 
will aggravate the uncertainty of economic 
policies. According to Baker’s statistical data, 
China’s economic policy uncertainty index 
has been rising since 2012, which is related to 
a series of supply-side structural reform policies 
promulgated by the Chinese government in 
recent years. In the context of ever-aggravated 
economic policy uncertainty in China, few 
scholars have paid attention to the moderating 
effect of economic policy uncertainty 
on institutional investors and innovation 
investment. The institutional investors share 
common interests with the company as its 
stakeholders. Relative to individual investors, 
institutional investors have more rational 
investment concepts and more sensitive to the 
change of economic policies. The corporate 
decisions made by the institutional investors 
are influenced, at all times, by the high risk 
of innovation investment and uncertainty of 
the external economic environment, including 
corporate development.
Hence, the 2010–2018 data of A-share-
listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock markets were selected. From the 
perspective of institutional investors, the 
economic policy uncertainty and institutional 
investors were combined with innovation 
investment to discuss the following questions: 
(1) Do institutional investors facilitate the 
corporate innovation investment? (2) How does 
the uncertainty of external macroeconomic 
policies influence institutional investors and 
innovation investment? (3) What is the action 
mechanism of institutional investors on the 
innovation investment?
First, from the influence of institutional 
investors on the innovation investment, the 
effect of institutional investors on corporate 
innovation investment was revealed. Second, 
the moderating effect of economic policy 
uncertainty on institutional investors and 
innovation investment was analyzed, and 
the impact of economic policy uncertainty on 
institutional investors and innovative investment 
was explored. Third, the influence mechanism 
of institutional investors on corporate innovation 
investment was discussed. Finally, the influence 
of institutional investors on the corporate 
innovation investment was deeply probed by 
analyzing company differences. In comparison 
with those of the existing literature, the marginal 
contributions of this study were manifested by 
the following aspects: the external macro-
environment is the foundation and precondition 
for enterprise decision-making, and the 
investment decisions of micro-enterprises will be 
influenced by the macroeconomic policies. The 
discussion about institutional investors stays at 
the micro-level in most of the present literature, 
whereas the micro-level has been involved 
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limitedly. This study exerted efforts to extend 
the research category of previous scholars 
and introduced the macroscopic economic 
policy uncertainty into the research on the 
relationship between institutional investors and 
innovation investment. The study also explored 
its modulating effect on institutional investors 
and innovation investment. Although extending 
the research literature regarding institutional 
investors, this research provides a macroscopic 
explanation basis for the existing literature from 
the level of micro-company.
The remainder of this study is arranged as 
follows: Section 1 sorts out the related literature 
involving the relationship between institutional 
investors and innovation investment and 
the regulatory role played by economic 
policy uncertainty. The study also proposes 
the research hypotheses. Then, Section 2 
introduces the research data and design, defines 
the related variables, and constructs empirical 
models. Section 3 analyzes the empirical result 
and displays the effect, influence mechanism, 
and heterogeneous influence of institutional 
investors on the innovation investment. This 
section also expounds on the moderating effect 
of economic policy uncertainty and further 
implements the robustness test. Next, Section 
4 further discusses the results and explains 
the possible reasons for the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 concludes the main research.




Since 2001, China’s financial regulatory 
agencies have proactively developed 
institutional investors. Therefore, the institutional 
investors, which are represented by securities 
investment funds, have achieved considerable 
progress. Moreover, they played significant 
roles in guiding the investments, stabilizing 
the market, and others. They have exerted 
increasingly significant influences and functions 
in China’s capital market through more than 
10 years of development. Their influence on 
the corporate innovation investment is mainly 
manifested by two aspects, namely, corporate 
governance and financing constraint.
The institutional investors influence the 
corporate innovation investment by exerting 
the effect of external corporate governance. 
They participate in the corporate management, 
standardize the corporate operation, propose 
governance problems and suggestions (Hartzell 
& Starks, 2003; McCahery et al., 2016), and 
conduct field investigations on the invested 
companies whenever possible (Filatotchev 
et al., 2019). Moreover, they have significant 
influences on the aspects of the formulation of 
personnel change plans, long-term development 
strategies, and others. Meanwhile, innovation 
investment is an important guarantee for the 
company to win market share and is of great 
significance to the company’s survival and 
development. The institutional investors evade 
the short-sighted behaviors of the management 
level, rationally analyze the market prospects, 
and strengthen the innovation investment 
by elevating its proportion through direct 
participation and proposal submission (Chen et 
al., 2007). Compared with retail investors, the 
institutional ones have stronger professional 
knowledge and more advanced governance 
concepts. They also understand and master 
the importance of innovation investment to 
long-term corporate value and externally 
impose pressure on corporate governance 
status by playing the role of “signal” (Li & Li, 
2008; Schmalz, 2018). In addition, institutional 
investors supervise the management layer 
more effectively, reduce their self-interest 
behaviors (Lu et al., 2012), and further boost 
the implementation of innovation investment 
decisions. The institutional investors, which 
press close to the corporate management 
layer, are also usually considered the traders 
with information superiority in the market 
(Bushee & Goodman, 2007). Thus, acquiring 
“soft information” is easier for them, thereby 
reducing the information asymmetry. Connelly 
et al. (2010) pointed out that if the proportion 
of shares held by the institutional investors 
is high, then the advantage in acquiring 
the information is highly evident, and the 
governance degree disclosed in the corporate 
information is also high. They further noted that 
the governance effect would be more apparent, 
and the positive governance effect weakens 
the agency problem generated by the goal 
inconsistency between the management layer 
and shareholders. As the direct stakeholders 
(Borochin & Yang, 2017; Liang, 2018), the 
institutional investors proactively promote 
the corporate implementation of innovation 
investment decisions and guarantee and ensure 
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the investment benefits of the companies to 
increase their own benefits. The innovation 
investment requires long-term corporate 
support in the aspects, such as information, 
talent, and technology. The institutional 
investors collect the investment information 
(Dierksmeier & Seele, 2020), recruit investment 
professionals, participate in the independent 
innovation decision-making of the invested 
companies (Gillan & Starks, 2003), and ensure 
the value-added effect of the investment 
projects. With the increasing shareholding 
ratio of institutional investors, the scope of their 
corporate governance will be broader, and the 
depth of governance will be greater. Therefore, 
they will have more positive motivations to 
participate in corporate governance to facilitate 
corporate innovation activities and support 
corporate innovation investment.
The institutional investors act on the 
corporate innovation investment by influencing 
the financing constraints faced by the company. 
High risk, high failure rate, unpredictability, and 
great time consumption are the outstanding 
features of innovation investment, and the 
long-term maintenance can be ensured only 
with substantial capital (Xie & Fang, 2011). 
Hence, innovation investment is more easily 
influenced by financing constraints. For the 
fund suppliers, the institutional investors have 
objective cognition of the corporate value. 
As rational investors relative to individual 
investors, the institutional investors mostly 
regard the corporate value as a basis for 
investment decision-making while not being 
influenced by the information beyond the 
value. They are capable of understanding 
and mastering the information, such as the 
importance of corporate innovation investment 
to long-term corporate value. Thus, the short-
sighted decisions faced by the corporate 
management layer are reduced, and they 
are more prone to the benefits brought by 
the innovation investment (Fan, 2018). The 
institutional investors can promote the corporate 
innovation investment and remit their financing 
constraints. The listed companies in China 
have a highly centralized ownership structure, 
which gives rise to the serious “insider control” 
problem. As the corporate agency problem 
becomes more severe, the share premium 
required by the investors will be higher, and 
the financing constraints will become more 
serious. The institutional investors can relieve 
the agency problem, reduce the opportunistic 
behaviors of corporate insiders, such as 
fund embezzlement, and remit the corporate 
financing constraints (Aggarwal et al., 2011). 
The innovation process has a high degree of 
information asymmetry, and the innovation 
outputs are generally intangible, with a value 
difficult to evaluate. Hence, obtaining the 
bank credits with innovation outputs as the 
mortgages is hard, the financing cost of 
innovation activities is high (Barber & Odean, 
2008; Brown & Petersen, 2011), and the 
financing constraints can significantly repress 
the corporate R&D input (Boone & White, 
2015). The institutional investors transmit 
the positive signal of the invested company 
and shape a good image for it through their 
investment behaviors. They are able to 
approach the corporate management layer 
and acquire “soft information”, which cannot 
be acquired by ordinary investors. Moreover, 
institutional investors transmit information 
related to corporate innovation activities to the 
outside world through information disclosure. 
This process can reduce the information 
asymmetry of corporate innovation activities, 
help the company to attract the attention of 
external fund suppliers, and increase the 
investment possibility. Therefore, institutional 
investors remit corporate financing constraints 
and facilitate their innovation activities to 
a certain extent.
To sum up, as an effective external 
governance mechanism, the institutional 
investors can bring down the principal-agent 
problem and relieve the information asymmetry. 
They can also alleviate corporate financing 
constraints by improving corporate internal 
governance. On this basis, the following 
hypotheses are proposed:
H1: Institutional investors drive corporate 
innovation investment.
H1a: Institutional investors improve the 
corporate innovation investment through their 
external corporate governance effect.
H1b: Institutional investors facilitate the 




The economic policy uncertainty is generated 
when the economic subjects fail to accurately 
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predict whether, when, and how the government 
will change the current economic policies 
(Gulen & Ion, 2015). Such uncertainty also 
occurs when the formulation, enforcement, and 
implementation effect of economic policies are 
unclear (Baker et al., 2016; Rao et al., 2017). 
In the present economic downturn, various 
problems are outstanding, such as weak 
market demand, underinvestment, and excess 
production capacity. Hence, the government 
frequently adjusts the economic policies to 
stimulate economic development to adapt 
to the new normalcy of China’s economic 
development. This adjustment will certainly 
increase the uncertainty of economic policies 
(Rao et al., 2017) and further influence the 
corporate innovation investment decision-
making. The frequent adjustment of economic 
policies from the perspective of the principal-
agent problem has greatly aggravated 
the information asymmetry. Considering 
self-interest motivation, the management 
supervisors are more prudent in decision-
making to evade the risks, which aggravates 
the decision-making difficulty, and reduce the 
investment level (Panousi & Papanikolaou, 
2012). Therefore, when the uncertainties of 
economic policies are increased, the principal-
agent and information asymmetry problems in 
the corporate R&D process will be aggravated. 
Moreover, innovation investment requires 
sustainable input and concern. Furthermore, 
given the long period and large fund demand, 
the institutional investors will cancel the 
innovation investments with high uncertainties 
out of consideration of their own interests. Thus, 
forming unified opinions and planning inside the 
company are difficult because of the increasing 
uncertainties of economic policies, thereby 
discouraging the enthusiasm of institutional 
investors for innovation activities and reducing 
the innovation investment.
Second, the frequent formulation of 
macroeconomic policies based on the judgment 
of corporate risk will greatly drive the fluctuations 
of the stock price. In addition, the business 
environment faced by the company will become 
more complicated, and thus, the external 
risks will be increased (Pástor & Veronesi, 
2013; Hoque et al., 2019). Under unstable or 
uncertain external macro-environment, the 
company will face an increasingly severe 
survival environment. Hence, the company will 
adjust the investment and operation strategies, 
expecting to offset the ever-increasing external 
risks by reducing its internal risks to avoid the 
superposition of internal and external risks. 
The institutional investors play important roles 
in the corporate operation and management 
and positively drive the decision-making, which 
disperses and offsets the corporate risks. They 
participate in corporate investment decision-
making through investigation, voting, and 
others. The institutional investors also evade 
the corporate risks under negative external 
situations, curtail the innovation investments 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2017; Lu et al., 2019c), 
and thus inhibit the corporate innovation 
investment.
In the end, from the theory of real option, if 
the corporate investment is regarded as a call 
option, then the uncertainty will increase the risk 
premium and option value under irreversible 
investment. The company will also postpone 
the current investment until the economic policy 
uncertainty tends to be steady (Bloom et al., 
2007; Pan et al., 2020). Starting from the theory 
of real option, the institutional investors will 
neglect the importance of innovation investment 
and postpone the current innovation investment 
decision-making during the corporate operation 
process due to the economic policy uncertainty. 
With the economic policy uncertainty, the 
institutional investors will attach importance 
to the increase of the current value, so the 
innovation investments are reduced. Given this, 
the following hypothesis is put forward:
H2: As the economic policy uncertainty 
increases, the promoting effect of institutional 




In view of the data disclosure regarding the 
R&D input of listed companies, the A-share-
listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock markets in 2010–2018 were selected as 
the research samples, which were screened 
and processed as follows: (1) The financial 
companies were excluded; (2) The ST and 
ST*-type-listed companies were excluded; 
(3) Companies with financial data missing 
were excluded; (4) The company-year samples 
undergoing insolvency were excluded; 
(5) The winsorization was implemented for all 
continuous variables in the model to reduce the 
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influence of extreme outliers. A total of 9,072 
company-year observed values of 1,008 listed 
companies were finally obtained. The economic 
policy uncertainty data were collected from 
the China economic policy uncertainty index 
compiled by Baker et al. (2018) through the 
keyword search in South China Morning Post. 
The other data, such as annual shareholding 
information of institutional investors, basic 
information of listed companies, transaction 
data, and financial data, are all derived from the 
Wind database.
2.2	 Modeling
To verify the previously proposed hypotheses, 
the 2008–2018 data of listed companies in 
China were utilized to construct the following 
models:
 RDi,t = β0 + β1 Institutioni,t + ∑Controli,t +  
+ ∑Year + ∑Industry + εi,t 
(1)
 RDi,t = β0 + β1 Institutioni,t + β2 EPUi,t + 
+ β3 Institutioni,t × EPUi,t + ∑Controli,t + 
+ ∑Year + ∑Industry + εi,t
 
(2)
Model (1) is used to investigate the 
influence of institutional investors on the 
innovation investment, whereas model (2) 
aims to explore the influence of economic 
policy uncertainty on institutional investors and 
innovation investment. Model (2) focuses on 
the interaction coefficient between economic 
policy uncertainty and institutional investors.
 Coni,t = δ0 + δ1 Institutioni,t + ∑Controli,t +  
+ ∑Year + ∑Industry + εi,t 
(3)
 RDi,t = φ0 + φ1 Institutioni,t + φ2 Coni,t +  
+ ∑Controli,t + ∑Year + ∑Industry + εi,t 
(4)
 SAi,t = α0 + α1 Institutioni,t + ∑Controli,t + 
+ ∑Year + ∑Industry + εi,t  
(5)
 RDi,t = γ0 + γ1 Institutioni,t + γ2 SAi,t +  
+ ∑Controli,t + ∑Year + ∑Industry + εi,t 
(6)
Models (1), (3), and (4) are used to verify 
the mediating effect of corporate governance 
(Con), whereas models (1), (5), and (6) are 




Innovation investment: The current indexes 
used to measure the innovation input 
include the following: the proportion of R&D 
expenditure in total assets, main business 
income, and total market value of the company. 
As the stock markets in China are not complete, 
the total market values of companies are of 
great uncertainty and variability. Moreover, 
the proportion of total assets, main business 
income, and others are greatly influenced by 
external factors, such as market situation. 
Then, the logarithm of company R&D input is 
taken as the proxy variable, which is used to 
measure the innovation investment (RD) with 
reference to Kong et al. (2019).
Explanatory Variable
Institutional investors: The institutional 
investors participate in corporate management 
mainly by holding their shares. Following Liang 
(2018), the shareholding ratio of institutional 
investors is used as the proxy variable of 
institutional investors, namely, the proportion 
of shares held by institutional investors in the 
number of a company’s circulating shares at the 
end of the year (Institution). In the meantime, 
several institutions are involved in the 
company’s shareholding. The degree to which 
the company is supervised by the institutions 
and the degree of its information disclosure 
may also be elevated. Therefore, according 
to Gao et al. (2020), the robustness test was 
conducted by taking the number of institutional 
investors holding shares of the company each 
year as a proxy variable.
Moderator Variable
Economic policy uncertainty: The economic 
policy uncertainty was measured using the 
economic policy uncertainty index (EPU) 
released jointly by Stanford University and 
University of Chicago. Based on the test 
analysis by taking South China Morning 
Post, founded in 1903, with the maximum 
circulation in Hong Kong, as the sample, Baker 
et al. (2016) identified the monthly published 
reports containing keywords, such as “China”, 
“economy”, “uncertainty”, and “policy” in this 
newspaper. They calculated the proportion of 
these reports in the total number of reports in 
this month to determine the monthly data of 
China’s economic policy uncertainty. Then, the 
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arithmetic mean value of the monthly economic 
policy uncertainty index was solved to acquire 
the annual data of economic policy uncertainty. 
In consideration of problems similar to the 
regression coefficient, the arithmetic mean 
value was divided by 100 (Rao et al., 2017).
Mediator Variables
The corporate governance (Con) and financing 
constraint (SA) were selected as the mediator 
variables, which were measured in the following 
ways: (1) the corporate governance (Con) 
was standardly measured using the internal 
control index of listed companies released 
by Xu et al. (2019) in DIB internal control and 
risk management database. (2) The financing 
constraint (SA) was measured after the SA 
index was established with reference to Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010) through the following model:
SA = – 0.737 × Size + 0.043 × Size2 –
– 0.04 × Age, (7)
where Size is the natural logarithm of total 
circulating market value, and Age is the time 
length of the transaction after listing. As the SA 
value increase, the financing constraint of listed 
companies will also increase.
Control variables: According to Liang 
(2018), company size (Size: Logarithm of year-
end number of company employees); liability-
asset ratio (LEV: Total liabilities/total assets); 
profitability (namely, return on equity, ROE: Net 
profit/gross revenue); growth ability (Growth: 
Growth rate of business revenue/100); duration 
of listing (AGE: Logarithm taken from number 
of years of listing +2); share ratio of the largest 
shareholder (FH: Number of shares hold by the 
largest shareholder/total number of shares); 
cash holding (Cash: Net operational cash 
flow/gross revenue); number of independent 
directors (IND: Year-end number of company’s 
independent directors); number of directors 
(DIRECTOR: Year-end number of company’s 
directors); duality (DUAL: If a person takes 
the posts of president and general manager 
simultaneously, the variable value is 1, or 
otherwise it is 0); international four major audit 
firms (SIDA: If the audit firm is among the 
international four major audit firms, the variable 
value is 1, or otherwise it is 0) were selected 
as the control variables. Then, year (Year) and 
industry (Industry) were controlled.
3.	 Result	Analysis
3.1	 Basic	Regression	Analysis
First, the regression analysis is conducted 
using model (1), and the fixed effects of year 
and industry are controlled using the fixed 
effect regression model. The standard error of 
regression was corrected through the company 
clustering effect. Tab. 1 shows the standard 
regression results regarding the influence of 
institutional investors on corporate innovation 
investment. In column (1), the time and industry 
effects are not controlled, but they are controlled 
in column (3). The obtained regression 
results indicate that the shareholding ratio of 
institutional investors is significantly positive 
at the 1% level. This result also certifies that 
institutional investors have a promoting effect 
on corporate innovation investment. In other 
words, with the increasing shareholding ratio 
of the institutional investors, the company 
expenditure in innovation investment is also 
increased.
From the previous part, the institutional 
investors facilitate innovation investment. 
If H2 holds true, then the interaction coefficient 
should be significantly negative. The time 
and industry effects are not controlled 
in column (2) of Tab. 1 but controlled in 
column (4). According to the regression 
results, the interaction term between the 
shareholding ratio of institutional investors 
and the economic policy uncertainty index 
is significantly negative at the 1% level. 
This finding means that the economic policy 
uncertainty represses the promoting effect 
of institutional investors on the innovation 
investment. Moreover, the supporting 
degree of institutional investors on the 
innovation investment is reduced. When the 
economic policy uncertainty is elevated, the 
promoting effect of institutional investors on 
the innovation investment will be weakened, 
so H2 is verified.
3.2	 Influence	Mechanism	Analysis
The classical three-step mediating effects 
test method was used to verify the mediating 
effects of financing constraint (SA) and 
corporate governance (Con). With reference 
to Wen et al. (2006), the test was carried out 
according to the following steps: regression 
of model (1) and verification of models (3) 
and (4) on the precondition that is significant. 
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If and are significant, then the institutional 
investors influence the innovation investment 
partially by reducing the financing constraints. 
If is significant (insignificant), then the agency 
problem exerts a partial (complete) mediating 
effect. On the contrary, if at least one between 
and is insignificant, then whether the mediating 
effect is significant should be judged through the 
Sobel test. The principles of models (5) and (6) 
are identical with those of models (3) and (4).
The test process is the same as the previous 
part. The coefficient of Institution in column (3) 
of Tab. 2 is significantly negative, indicating that 
the institutional investors relieve the financing 


































































































Year No No Yes Yes
Industry No No Yes Yes
Observations 9,072 9,072 9,072 9,072
R-squared 0.375 0.418 0.513 0.513
Source: own
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; t-values reported in 
parentheses.
Tab. 1: Institutional investors and innovation investment
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constraints. Moreover, the coefficient of SA in 
column (4) is significantly positive. This result 
means that institutional investors influence the 
corporate innovation investment by influencing 
the financing constraints. The coefficient of 
Institution in column (4) is significantly positive. 
This result indicates that, according to the test 
procedures of Wen et al. (2006), reducing 
the financing constraints is a partial mediator 
between institutional investors and corporate 
innovation investment. Hence, H1b is verified.
3.3	 Endogeneity	Analysis
The following robustness test was implemented 
to further verify the reliability of regression 
results and make the conclusions more robust.
In consideration of the possible reversal 
cause-effect problem between institutional 
investors and corporate innovation investment, 
namely, the institutional investors will probably 
hold more shares in the companies with satisfying 
innovation investment, the instrumental variable 
method was used in this study to solve the 
sample endogeneity problem. The number 
of institutional investors holding shares in the 
invested company was used for the regression of 
instrumental variables with reference to Gao et al. 
(2020). From the regression results in Tab. 3, the 
number of institutional investors in the invested 
company (Number) in column 1 is significantly 
positive at the 1% level. Moreover, the interaction 
coefficient between Number and EPU in column 2 
is significantly negative at the 1% level, so the 
research conclusion still holds true.
3.4 Robustness Test
Different from the simple arithmetic mean method 
for the monthly data of economic policy uncertainty, 
the annual EPU was calculated using the geometric 
mean method. With reference to the processing 
method adopted by Pástor and Veronesi (2013), 
the geometric mean of the 12-month data in each 
year was taken to obtain the annual EPU data, 
which was then used as the EPU index of this year, 
specifically shown in Formula (8):
EPUSyear =     EPU1month EPU2month …
 … EPU12month (8)
where EPUSyear is the annual economic policy 
uncertainty index, EPU1month, EPU2month, …, 
EPU12month represent the economic policy 
uncertainty indexes in 12 months within one 
year, respectively, and column (1) of Tab. 4 
shows the regression results. The influence of 
economic policy uncertainty on the institutional 
investors and innovation investment still 


























Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,181 6,181 6,181 6,181
R-squared 0.210 0.557 0.855 0.555
Source: own
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; t-values reported in 
parentheses.




The main problem faced in the research 
on economic policy uncertainty is the missing 
variable problem. The influences of economic 
policy uncertainty as discovered in this research 
may include the influences of factors, such as 
macroeconomic uncertainty. In the previous 
regression analysis, the corporate internal 
factors are controlled, without the consideration 
of the influence of macroeconomic uncertainty, 
which may exist. In view of the influence of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, the macroe-
conomic leading indicator (MLI), consumer 
confidence index (CCI), and entrepreneur 
confidence index (ECI) were added into the 
regression analysis, similar to McCahery 
et al. (2016) to measure macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Column (2) of Tab. 4 presents the 
results consistent with the principal regression, 
thereby verifying the robustness of the research 
conclusions.
3.5	 Heterogeneity	Analysis
Under the special market system environment 
in China, the nature of property rights will have 
a great influence on management behaviors. 
According to the nature of property rights of 
listed companies, the full samples were divided 
into state-owned and private company groups, 
followed by the test group using model (1). 
The regression results in columns (1) and (2) 
of Tab. 5 show that the interaction coefficient 
between institutional investors and economic 
policy uncertainty is significantly negative in 
the state-owned companies but insignificantly 
positive in the private companies. This result 
demonstrates that the institutional investors 
in the state-owned companies weaken their 
innovation investment due to the economic 
policy uncertainty, which further reduces their 
promoting effect on the innovation investment. 
However, among private companies, the 
influence of economic policy uncertainty on 
the innovation investment of institutional 
investors is insignificant. Based on the above 
results, the economic policy uncertainty exerts 
evidently different effects on the relationship 
between institutional investors and corporate 
innovation investment under different natures 
of property rights. Furthermore, the economic 
policy uncertainty restricts the effect exerted 
by the institutional investors in the state-owned 
companies.
The densities of technological factors and 
R&D intensity are varied in companies occupied 
in different industries. With reference to 
Hu and Png (2013), the company samples were 
subdivided into new and high-tech companies 
and non-new and high-tech companies to 
analyze whether the institutional investors 
















Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; t-values reported in 
parentheses.
Tab. 3: Regression results of instrumental variables
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investment under aggravated economic policy 
uncertainty. From the regression results in 
columns (3) and (4) of Tab. 5, the interaction 
coefficient between institutional investors and 
economic policy uncertainty is insignificant 
among the new and high-tech companies but 
significantly negative among the non-new and 
high-tech companies. This result indicates that 
the economic policy uncertainty will aggravate 
the negative effect of institutional investors on 
the innovation investment in the non-new and 
high-tech companies but not on the relationship 
between institutional investors and innovation 
investment in new and high-tech companies.
Good investor protection means that 
the government will provide companies 
with advantageous policies, including talent 
introduction, tax preference, and fiscal 
subsidies (Andrlova et al., 2020). Such policies 
will mitigate the constraints, such as talent, tax, 
technology, and capital, faced by the corporate 
R&D input, improve the feasibility of the R&D 
input, and reduce the R&D input risks. The 
investor protection index was introduced in 
this research, and the samples were divided 
into companies with strong and weak investor 
protection based on the median of the regional 
investor protection index. The regression results 
in columns (1) and (2) of Tab. 8 show that the 
interaction coefficient of innovation investment 
between institutional investors and economic 
policy uncertainty is insignificant in the area 
with high investor protection. However, such 
coefficient is significantly negative in the area 
with low investor protection. This result indicates 
that in the area with strong investor protection, 
the economic policy uncertainty will not result in 





















Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; t-values reported in 
parentheses.
Tab. 4: Robustness test
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on innovation investment but will significantly 
repress the relationship between institutional 
investors and innovation investment in the area 
with weak investor protection.
According to Doing Business Report 
2020 released by the World Bank, China’s 
ranking was elevated to 31st place (by 15 
places) in 2018. Under the innovation-driven 
Variable
SOE Non-SOE High and new No high and new






























Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,617 5,455 4,536 4,536
R-squared 0.524 0.514 0.726 0.553
Source: own






































Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,004 4,021 4,931 4,141
R-squared 0.528 0.510 0.544 0.483
Source: own
Note: *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively; t-values are reported in 
parentheses.
Tab. 5: Influences of nature of property right, and industrial characteristic
Tab. 6:  Influences of investor and IPR protection
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development strategy, the intellectual property 
right (IPR) protection should be strengthened to 
create a good business environment (Kondić & 
Knok, 2020). With powerful IPR protection, the 
probability for a company’s innovative product 
and benefit to be corroded and extruded will 
be reduced, and the motivation for R&D input 
will be enhanced (Aghion et al., 2013). After 
China’s accession to the WTO, the country 
has continuously improved Patent Law and 
strengthened the juridical enforcement of IPR 
protection. With reference to Shen and Huang 
(2019), the regional IPR protection intensity was 
measured from the perspective of the regional 
number of settled IPR-related cases. From the 
regression results in columns (3) and (4) of 
Tab. 6, the interaction coefficient of innovation 
investment between institutional investors and 
economic policy uncertainty is insignificant 
in the area with a high IPR protection level. 
However, this coefficient is significantly negative 
in the area with a low IPR protection level. This 
result manifests that in the area with strong IPR 
protection, the influence of economic policy 
uncertainty on the institutional investors and 
innovation investment is weakened. However, 
the economic policy uncertainty evidently 
impedes the promoting effect of institutional 
investors on the innovation investment in the 
area with weak IPR protection.
4. Discussion
Through the regression results in Tab. 1, the 
institutional investors remarkably improve 
the corporate innovation investment, and this 
conclusion, which is identical to that of the 
existing literature (particularly Fan, 2018), verifies 
H1. The possible reason for this conclusion is 
that institutional investors play important roles in 
reducing corporate information asymmetry and 
relieving the principal-agent problem. With a high 
shareholding ratio, institutional investors can have 
close contact with the company management 
layer and acquire additional information than 
ordinary investors. This advantage boosts the 
message transmission to the external investors 
and reduces the information asymmetry. As 
proactive investors holding a great number 
of corporate stocks, the institutional investors 
fail to exit their own accord while not bearing 
any loss. They are motivated to take actions to 
supervise the companies, which will also conduct 
additional innovation activities. Therefore, 
their shareholding ratio is positively correlated 
with innovation investment. The increasing 
shareholding ratio of institutional investors will 
effectively discourage the company management 
layer from opportunistic behaviors, such as fund 
embezzlement (Lin et al., 2011; Lu et al., 2019b). 
Moreover, this increase in the shareholding ratio 
will lower the short-sighted decision-making 
pressure faced by the company management 
layer and increase the company resources 
applicable to the innovation investment.
Through the regression results in Tab. 2, 
after the crossover term between economic 
policy uncertainty and institutional investor 
is added, the symbol is apparently negative, 
which verifies H2. The economic policy 
uncertainty weakens the promoting effect of 
institutional investors on innovation investment, 
which is a new finding of this research. The 
possible reason for this conclusion is that 
the increasing uncertainties brought by the 
frequent adjustment of economic policies 
weaken the rational market expectations made 
by the institutional investors (Gulen & Ion, 
2015), waver their investment resolutions, and 
inhibit their supporting degree for the corporate 
innovation investment. Moreover, the economic 
policy uncertainty can give rise to the fluctuation 
of corporate value, that is, the company may 
suffer from a serious decline of corporate value. 
Therefore, to evade the risks, the company 
should take conservative decisions to cope with 
the challenge brought by the policy fluctuations, 
thus reducing its innovation investment. 
Economic policy is an important government 
means of macro-regulation, and the ever-
changing economic policies will aggravate the 
uncertainty, and consequently, the investors 
will belittle the investment prospects. As the 
innovation investment is a high-risk long-term 
investment project, innovation investment is 
highly sensitive to related policies. Thus, the 
economic policy uncertainty weakens the 
promoting effect of institutional investors on the 
innovation investment.
From the regression results in Tab. 3, the 
institutional investors relieve the corporate 
financing constraints by improving the corporate 
governance and further enhance the corporate 
innovation investment. The advantages of 
institutional investments in three aspects – 
size, personnel, and information – provide 
advantageous conditions for them to participate 
in the corporate governance, improve the internal 
control quality, effectively counterbalance 
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the opportunistic behaviors, such as fund 
embezzlement of the company management 
layer, and increase the company resources 
applicable to the innovation investment (Fan, 
2018). With the “wind indicator effect”, the 
institutional investors send the positive signal of 
the company to the market. Then, they transmit 
the information that they master regarding the 
company’s innovation activities to the capital 
market through their investment behaviors in 
way of information disclosure. This process can 
mitigate the information asymmetry with respect 
to the company’s innovation activities in the 
capital market and help the company to attract 
potential external fund suppliers (Almazan 
et al., 2005; Guido et al., 2020). Therefore, 
institutional investors relieve the company’s 
financing constraints and facilitate its innovation 
investment by improving corporate governance.
From the regression results in Tabs. 5 and 6, 
the economic policy uncertainty exerts a minor 
inhibitory effect on the private companies, 
new and high-tech companies, and those with 
low market competition. For the investors and 
companies with high IPR protection level, the 
institutional investors and corporate innovation 
investment are influenced by the economic 
policy uncertainty to a minimum extent. 
This conclusion is consistent with that of the 
existing literature (Ferreira & Matos, 2008; 
Alan et al., 2019). Considering the diversified 
business objectives, the institutional investors 
have limited right of speech in the corporate 
governance of state-owned companies 
under the competitive manager market. The 
economic policy uncertainty aggravates market 
uncertainty. In addition, the management layer 
will lay more emphasis on other interests, such 
as political and social interests, except for 
economic performance when making decisions 
(Brown & Petersen, 2011; Lu et al., 2019a). 
Therefore, conservative business strategies 
will be adopted, which, to a great extent, 
reduce the promoting effect of institutional 
investors on the innovation investment. If the 
economic policy uncertainty is high, then the 
risk of being knocked out is also high. The 
perfect and complete investor protection and 
IPR protection provide a system guarantee for 
institutional investors to participate in corporate 
governance. Such protection will also create 
a good business environment and weaken the 
negative impacts of economic policy uncertainty 
on institutional investors. Through the grouping 
test, the significant roles played by institutional 
investors in stabilizing the securities market and 
boosting economic development are verified.
Conclusions
The influence of institutional investors on the 
corporate innovation investment was explored 
from the perspective of economic policy 
uncertainty. The 2010–2018 panel data in 
China were used to investigate the influences of 
institutional investors and innovation investment. 
Then, the moderating effect of economic policy 
uncertainty on institutional investors and innovation 
investment was analyzed. The main conclusions 
are as follows: (1) Institutional investors boost 
the corporate innovation investment; (2) The 
aggravated economic policy uncertainty inhibits 
the promoting effect of institutional investors on the 
innovation investment; (3) Institutional investors 
improve the corporate governance and facilitate 
the corporate innovation investment by remitting 
the financing constraints; (4) The economic 
policy uncertainty inhibits, to a small extent, the 
promoting effect of institutional investors on the 
innovation investments of private companies, 
new and high-tech companies; (5) If a listed 
company is located in an area with a high level 
of investor and IPR protection, then the economic 
policy uncertainty has a minimal influence on the 
institutional investors and corporate innovation 
investment. The research conclusions can provide 
a macroscopic interpretation mechanism for 
developing institutional investors and reveal the 
importance of consistent and stable governmental 
economic policies to corporate development.
Enriching the related literature in the 
research field of innovation investment, this 
research provides a brand-new research 
idea from the perspective of institutional 
investors. Moreover, this study provides 
a useful supplementation for the innovation 
investment mechanism of listed companies. As 
an important macro factor, the economic policy 
uncertainty will probably become a new signal 
influencing the corporate innovation investment. 
However, limitations are not avoided in the 
research. For instance, the instrumental 
variable method cannot completely overcome 
the endogeneity problem. Moreover, the EPU 
measurement method will be disturbed by the 
external economic environment. Both of which, 
to a certain extent, give rise to some biased 
errors in the estimation results.
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